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February 1, 2020 
 
 
Professor John W. Goodell 
Editor, Research in International Business and Finance 
 
Dear Professor Goodell,  
 
Thank you very much for your invitation for revision of my paper with Seungho Lee and Nabil 
El Meslmani (RIBAF_2019_952) entitled: “Pricing Efficiency and Arbitrage in the Bitcoin Spot 
and Futures Markets,” for  Research in International Business and Finance 
, 
We are submitting the revision herein. This version addresses all the issues raised by the three 
referees, as indicated in our detailed response to the referees and in the revised version of the 
paper.  We are grateful to you for your encouragement and to the referees for the several 
constructive comments that have considerably improved the quality of the paper.  
 





Lorne N. Switzer, Ph.D. 
Professor of Finance 
The Van Berkom Endowed Chair in Small-Cap Equities 
John Molson School of Business 
Concordia University 
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W. 
Montreal, Quebec, CANADA H3G 1M8 
Tel: 514-848-2424, x 2960 (office); 514-481-4561 (home and FAX); 
E-mail: lorne.switzer@concordia.ca 
Response to Referee Report, Reviewer #1 
Research in International Business and Finance 
Pricing Efficiency and Arbitrage in the Bitcoin Spot and Futures Markets, 
RIBAF_2019_952 
Thank you for your constructive feedback on our work, and for the opportunity to revise and 
resubmit our paper. We are pleased that you find the idea meritorious. We highly appreciate your 
comments and suggestions for improvements, which have helped us to make a substantial revision 
of the paper. We have addressed your remarks in the revised draft. In this document, we provide 
detailed responses to your specific comments (in Italics). Since we received reports from two other 
referees as well, some of the changes are due to that report. We hope for your understanding of the 
fact that we occasionally had to decide between suggestions made by you and the other referees. 
 
The authors apply Fama's (1984) regression approach for speculative efficiency on Bitcoin spot 
and futures' prices. They find that the futures basis does provide some information on future 
changes in the spot price, and the risk premium, although the predictors are not unbiased. 
Further, they analyze systematic deviations from no-arbitrage prices and find them to widen 
during episodes of hackings, frauds, and issuances of alternative cryptocurrencies. 
The ability of futures markets to predict subsequent spot prices has been a controversial topic for 
a number of years. Thus, it is a neat idea to discuss this topic for Bitcoin. However, the empirical 
part of the paper is too thin for a serious contribution to the existing literature. In the following, 
I will give more detailed comments on my opinion: 
Major Comments: 
1. There is a variety of published papers dealing with the relation between the Bitcoin spot 
and future markets, not only Baur and Dimpfl (2018). In this paper, there is no literature review 
at all, although there are a few papers dealing with the same research question as yours. To 
make a clear contribution the existing literature, it is essential to mark out your findings against 
what other authors found. 
Response: 
 
We appreciate these comments that allow us to better motivate the paper and to better articulate 
and clarify its contributions to the literature.  To this end, we have rewritten the introduction, and 
have provided a new Literature Review section, that covers the burgeoning literature that is alluded 
to by the referee. This provides a basis for benchmarking our approaches and findings  in terms of  
extant studies.  As noted therein (on pages 3-6): 
 
“Public pricing for Bitcoin commenced with the launch of the platform: 
BitcoinMarket.com in March 2010. The price of Bitcoin at the outset of trading was a mere $0.003. 
After 16 months, it soared to $31. From that time forth, Bitcoin’s price has experienced periods of 
extreme volatility characterized by episodes of explosive appreciations and depreciations, 
unhampered by regulatory price limits or circuit breakers usually present in many organized 
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exchanges. The novelty of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, as well as Bitcoin’s unprecedented 
performance have drawn the attention of practitioners, regulators, and scholars.  Indeed a 
considerable literature has emerged. The literature has addressed Bitcoin from a technical analysis 
perspective (e.g. bubbles, explosive behavior), fundamental supply analysis perspective, as well 
an efficient markets perspective.  In regard to the former, a popular approach has adopted the 
speculative bubble framework (see e.g.  Garcia et al. 2014; Cheah and Fry 2015; Li et al. 2018; 
Hafner 2018). Cheung et al. (2015) as well as Su et al. (2018).  Cagli (2019) and Bouri et al (2019) 
provide evidence that cryptocurrencies follow an explosive process framework.   
Other papers have taken a more fundamental approach, looking at basic market supply-  
demand factors within a commodity market perspective.  Regarding the former alternative perspective 
is that price movements in Bitcoin can be viewed from a commodity market perspective: since 
mining of the cryptocurrency is a costly computational process, its price behavior may be related 
to basic demand/supply factors.  One way to address this question is to assess the extent to which 
its price is equal to its intrinsic value. Under the assumption that cryptocurrency markets are 
perfectly competitive, analyzing the marginal mining cost of Bitcoin may provide the outline to 
find its appropriate intrinsic value. For instance, given the considerable gap between the market 
price of Bitcoin and its mining cost, which is about $4,050, one can argue that there may be other 
factors which affect the intrinsic value of the cryptocurrency.   For example, whereas Kristoufek 
(2015) finds that several fundamental macroeconomic factors including usage in trade, money 
supply and price level may influence Bitcoin price in long run. Ciaian et al. (2016) highlight that 
market forces of supply and demand as well as investment attractiveness rather than 
macroeconomics factors play a major impact on Bitcoin price formation. Indeed Hayes (2016) 
introduces a model for determining the value of a bitcoin-like cryptocurrency by calculating its 
cost of production. He asserts that while the bubbles approach has merits, there is also some 
support for a fundamental price floor based on the marginal cost of production. An alternative 
fundamental commodity valuation perspective is provide by Shazad et al (2019) and Wang et al 
(2019). They argue that the cryptocurrency market can be looked at as weak “safe haven” 
commodities such as Gold. This contrasts with Yermack (2015) and Bauer et al (2017).  Chan et 
al (2019) analyze the hedging ability of Bitcoin against major equity indices and uncover that 
Bitcoin can actually serve as a hedge for S&P500 using medium data frequency. Other studies 
have looked at interconnections between cryptocurrencies themselves, as well as potential causal 
factors for cryptocurrency returns.  In this vein, Beneki et al (2019) find evidence of volatility 
transmission between Bitcoin and Ethereum markets, and suggest possible trading strategies across 
cryptocurrencies. Dastgir et al (2019) find a bi-directional causal relationship between Bitcoin 
attention, measured by Google trends and search queries and Bitcoin’s return. These relationships 
are observed primarily in the tails of the returns’ distribution. 
A third approach, which serves as the basis of our analyses is the efficient markets 
perspective. Urquhart (2016) provides evidence of Fama (1970) weak form inefficiency in tests 
based on the dependent structure of the time series behavior of the cryptocurrency’s returns. 
Additionally, Yonghong et al (2019), Bariviera (2017) and Zhang (2018) provide evidence of a 
long-term memory process in the Bitcoin market with various windows of time-serious data. 
Charfeddine and Maouchi (2019) show  Long Range Dependence (LRD) behavior in the returns 
and volatility series of several cryptocurrencies. In contrast, Sensoy (2019) reveals that Bitcoin 
low frequency (intraday prices) prices exhibit fewer inefficiencies.  Gandar et al (2018) identify 
potential sources of inefficiencies in the spot market: suspicious trades that have a significant 
impact on spot prices. 
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A few studies have appeared that look at the effects of trading of bitcoin futures markets 
on the efficiency of the Bitcoin spot markets. Köchling et al (2019) suggest that the introduction 
of Bitcoin futures has improved the pricing efficiency of Bitcoin spot prices. However, they do not 
look at the interactions between the futures and spot prices of Bitcoins.  In an important paper 
along these lines, Baur and Dimpfl (2018) show evidence that the futures price of Bitcoin is led 
by its spot price.   In contrast, Kapar and Olmo (2019) suggest, that while both futures and spot 
markets respond to common news. They also show Bitcoin futures price might provide significant 
information for Bitcoin spot price discovery. In a more recent paper, Fassas, Papadamou, and 
Koulis (2020) show similar results.  They also find a bi-directional dependence of intraday 
volatility for both markets.  None of the aforementioned studies examine whether the information 
imparted by futures prices may be biased. 
Our study proposes to reexamine the Baur and Dimpfl (2018), Kapar and Olmo (2019) and 
Fassas, Papadamou, and Koulis (2020) to shed new light on predictive content of futures vs spot 
markets, as well as the speculative efficiency of the markets.  Our approach allows us to test for 
potential biases in the futures basis as a predictor of spot prices and of futures prices as predictors 
of spot prices.  In addition, we will look at the markets in terms of arbitrage efficiency: a) Do prices 
deviate from arbitrage bounds that give rise to profitable trading opportunities? b) Can we identify 
sources that are associated with persistent deviations from no-arbitrage bounds?” 
 
2. Regarding the empirical methodology used in the paper, there are some improvements to 
the Fama (1984) approach discussed in the literature. Applying these more sophisticated 
methodologies would improve your paper significantly. 
 Response: Thank you very much for this excellent suggestion. To address this question, we have 
added an additional test of speculative efficiency to complement the Fama (1984), and  Fama and 
French (1987) regression approach for speculative efficiency (which has also been used by  Khoury 
et al (1991), Switzer and El-Khoury (2007), Switzer and Fan (2009), Huisman and Kilic (2012), 
Symeonidis et al (2012), Asche et al (2016),  Stevens (2013), Wu and Zheng (2019) and several 
other studies).  
Specifically, in this version we perform new Cointegration Tests that for directly test whether  
futures prices as unbiased predictors of spot prices. As we note in the new section 3.1.2: 
“As a second test of Bitcoin Futures market efficiency, we examine the nature of the 
cointegration of spot and futures prices spot prices, and the potential biases of the cointegration 
vector. This approach typically focuses on the Keynes-Hicks and Fama (1970) weak form 
market/speculative market efficiency tests of the form: 
  
                   titt FS                             (3) 
In this approach, market efficiency requires that futures prices should be unbiased predictors of 
future spot prices.  Simple empirical tests of the speculative efficiency hypothesis are based on 
tests of the joint hypothesis 1,0    in (3).  
Basic cointegration tests for Bitcoin spot and futures are provided in Kapar and Olmo 
(2019) and Fassas, Papadamou, et al (2020). .  In this paper we use Johansen’s (1988, 1991)) 
approach in order to test for cointegration, as well as for efficiency and bias of Bitcoin Futures. 











     t-1X D ΠX Γ X     (4) 
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where tX = tX - 1tX ; D is a deterministic term;Π  and Γ are matrices of coefficients. 
The cointegration relationship is examined by looking at the rank of the coefficient of matrixΠ . 
If Π  = 0, there is no cointegration vector, hence no cointegration relationship.  
If Π  = 1, then the two series are cointegrated (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The trace and 
maximum statistics are used.1 If the Bitcoin spot and futures contract prices are cointegrated, then 
a long-run relationship must exist between these two series. 
 Cointegration is considered as a necessary condition for market efficiency (Lai and Lai, 
1991). However, in order to conclude efficiency, we also examine whether futures contracts are 
unbiased predictors of future spot markets i.e. α = 0 and β = 1 In this framework, as we note 
(page 12): 
“Using Likelihood Ratio tests, we  reject the null that the cointegrating vector is given by 
(1,-1). Future contract prices are found to be biased predictors of future spot prices,” This confirms 
our results from the Fama (1984), and Fama and French (1987) regression tests. 
 
Minor Comments: 
- The introduction needs reorganization. You start with a long paragraph  about the 
history of Bitcoin, while the reader cannot find the contribution of your paper until the end of 
page 2. 
Response: In this version, we have completely rewritten the introduction to focus on our 
contributions vis à vis the extant literature.    
- In Section 2, again, you state a lot of background information. For example, you discuss 
the factors which affect the intrinsic value of Bitcoin. You could shorten this passage by 
mentioning studies which already analyzed these questions (e.g. Kristoufek (2015) and Ciaian et 
al. (2016)). 
Response: As we indicate above, we have completely rewritten this section, as a new Literature 
Review, to better contextualize the paper (as suggested by the other referees as well) and to 
highlight our contributions in terms of the extant literature. 
 
- The quality of the figures is poor. For example, you cannot read the y-axis labels of 
Figure 2. If possible, try to use vector graphics. 
                                                          
1 The trace statistic tests the null that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against and 
unspecified hypothesis; whereas the maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null that the number of cointegrating 
vectors is r against an alternative of r +1, where r is the canonical correlation coefficient between the two series. 
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Response: Thank you for noticing this.  In response to Referee 2, we have deleted Figures 1 and 
2.  The remaining figures have been edited, as necessary to improve their legibility. 
 - On page 8, you copied and pasted a whole paragraph including Table 4, which is now 
twice in the paper: ''The Wald tests do not support unbiasedness of the predictors[...]" 
Response:  Thank you for noticing this.  We have removed this redundancy in this version of the 
paper. 
 
Thank you again for your careful and thoughtful reading of our work. The paper has greatly 






Response to Referee Report, Reviewer 2 
Research in International Business and Finance 
Pricing Efficiency and Arbitrage in the Bitcoin Spot and Futures Markets, 
RIBAF_2019_952 
 
Thank you for your constructive feedback on our work, and for the opportunity to revise and 
resubmit our paper. We are pleased that you find our idea meritorious. We highly appreciate your 
comments and suggestions for improvements, which have helped us to make a substantial revision 
of the paper. We have addressed your remarks in the revised draft. In this document, we provide 
detailed responses to your specific comments (in Italics). Since we received reports from two other 
referees as well, some of the changes are due to that report. We hope for your understanding of the 
fact that we occasionally had to decide between suggestions made by you and the other referees. 
 
The research idea is very promising and offers great potential to understanding the crypcurrency 
landscape, but the paper seems to suffer from several serious shortcomings: 
 
1. The research question is both unclear and unmotivated. The idea seems to shift from pricing of 
Bitcoin to investigation of futures-spot price discovery in the Bitcoin market. 
Also, it is not clear to the reader why this subject is important enough to be investigated. The 
motivation remains unclear both in Sections 1 and 2. Why is the topic important? Are there any 
other articles on the subject? What do they find? How does this paper fit in? 
The only paper that is mentioned as the foundation of this paper is Baur and Dimpfl (2018). But 
they receive no mention in the introduction section where the contribution is discussed. 
This may help you: read paragraph 1 of Kapar and Olmo (2019) for the motivation to the price 
discovery process of Bitcoin. 
Response: We appreciate these comments that allow us to better motivate the paper, and to 
articulate and clarify its contributions to the literature. As noted in our response to Reviewer 1, 
we have rewritten the introduction, and have introduced a new Literature Review section. This 
provides a basis for benchmarking our approach and findings in terms of the extant literature.    
Thank you for pointing out the Kapar and Olmo (2019) article, which we now cite, which as you 
point out helps considerably in motivating our paper. 





(a) Kapar and Olmo (2019), Economics Letters 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/So1651765183o444o 
(b) Akyildirim et al. (2019), Finance Research Letters 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S15446123193o4714 
(c) Yo hong et al. (2018), Finance Research Letters 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S15446123173o6682 
(d) Urquhart (2016), Economics Letters 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/So1651765163o364o 
Response:  Thank you for suggesting these excellent citations.  We have cited these articles, and 
several others to our new Literature Review section, where we better frame our approach and 
contributions.  As we note in our response to Referee 1, we have organized the extant literature 
into three approaches:  technical analysis perspective (e.g. bubbles, explosive behavior), 
fundamental supply analysis perspective, as well an efficient markets perspective.  We note that 
our contributions relate to tests of efficient markets in terms of speculative efficiency. As 
indicated, our study test for potential biases in the futures basis as a predictor of spot prices and 
of futures prices as predictors of spot prices. In regard to the latter, in this version, we perform 
new Cointegration Tests that directly test whether futures prices are unbiased predictors of spot 
prices.  In addition, we look at the markets in terms of arbitrage efficiency: a) Do prices deviate 
from arbitrage bounds that give rise to profitable trading opportunities? b) Can we identify 
sources that are associated with deviations from no-arbitrage bounds?  
 
3. Even when the empirical methodology used seems relevant to the research question at 
hand, I have the following reservations: 
(a) Why is this methodology preferred over other methods available? Do you have references 
to support your view that these indeed work better or have fewer problems associated with 
interpretation for example? 
Response: Thank you for mentioning this issue. 
As we note in this version of the paper in the new footnote 1,   “This approach has been widely 
used as a benchmark test in speculative efficiency studies for a wide range of futures products. 
See  e.g. Khoury et al (1991), Switzer and El-Khoury (2007), Switzer and Fan (2009)), Huisman 
and Kilic (2012), Symeonidis et al (2012), Asche et al (2016),  Stevens (2013), Wu and Zheng 
(2019) to name a few.” In addition, as discussed in our response to a similar question of referee 1 
(Comment 1), in this version we perform new Cointegration Tests that for directly test whether  
futures prices as unbiased predictors of spot prices. These complementary results are shown in 
this revised version of the paper in the new section 3.1.2. 
Finally, the cost of carry model  benchmark and deviations from the cost of carry have been used 
widely in the literature to address efficiency in the no-arbitrage sense (e.g. MacKinlay and 
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Ramaswamy (1988), and Bhatt and Cakici (1990), Switzer et al (2000), Andani et al (2009), and 
Switzer et al (2013)).   
(b) The results from the tables 2,3,4,5,6,9,and 10 are not well-explained. It is not sufficient to 
indicate the general conclusion of the coefficients. Instead, it will help if at least one coefficient 
per table is explained  so that the reader is in a better position to read, interpret and form his 
own conclusions about the results. 
Response: This version of the paper provides such details for each of the tables to enhance the 
presentation of our empirical findings  
 
4. For me, figures 1 and 2 (Bitcoin versus 5 stock indices) are totally unnecessary. First, 
they are not directly helpful in understanding your research question (futures-spot price 
discovery) and second, it would be enough to cite some papers that document the hedging/ 
diversification properties of the Bitcoin if you believe that this discussion is absolutely necessary. 
For instance, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S10629769173o418o 
Response: Thank you for this suggestion. These figures have been deleted from this version of 
the paper. 
5. Section 4 that investigates the sources of futures-spot deviation is very interesting. 
However, here are my concerns: 
(a) Why do you believe that frauds/ hacks and the introduction of other cryptocurrencies 
should affect Bitcoin efficiency? 
Response: As we note in our revised paper (page 9), “Bitcoin thefts/hacks and alternative 
cryptocurrency issues, as they may contribute to inefficiency, through reduced liquidity and thin 
trading.. Bitcoin thefts and hacks serve to lower the confidence of investors in Bitcoin. Markets 
with compromised integrity are by their very essence inefficient. New cryptocurrencies may 
serve as alternatives or substitutes for Bitcoin, and their issuance should lower the demand for 
Bitcoin, which would contribute to market thinness.  There is a fairly large literature that relates 
illiquid markets   informational inefficiency (see e.g. Tomek, (1980), Elfakhani et al (1999), 
Garbade and Silber (1983), and Figuerola-Ferretti, and Gonzalo (2010)). Thin trading in spot and 
futures markets together impedes efficiency in terms of price discovery of both markets, which 
would impede arbitrage (see e.g. Adamer, Bohl, and Gross (2016) and  Schroeder, Tonsor, and 
Coffey (2019)).  Indeed, trading thinness is a key factor underlying the demise of the CBOE 
futures contracts for Bitcoin.”  Our results are consistent with these hypotheses.   
 
(b) Are there any papers to suggest this? Which ones? What do they find? 
Response: In a recent study published in the Journal of Monetary Economics, Gandal, Hamrick, 
Moore and Oberman (2018) similarly use dummy variables and document the impact of 
suspicious trades and potential price manipulation in the Bitcoin market. This paper documents 
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that fraudulent activity undermines efficiency of the markets.  Our paper is consistent with this 
result. New issues of alternative currencies can also be disruptive. We believe that our paper is 
the first in the literature to look at the impact of alternative cryptocurrencies to document this 
finding. 
 
(c) Is your methodology of using a dummy variable for 'Newcoin' and 'Hack_Cum' already 
documented elsewhere? This gives greater credibility to your techniques and results. 
As mentioned above (response to point b) “In a recent study published in the Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Gandal, Hamrick, Moore and Oberman (2018) similarly use dummy 
variables and document the impact of suspicious trades and potential price manipulation in the 
Bitcoin market.  This paper documents that fraudulent activity undermines efficiency of the 
markets.  Our paper is consistent with this result. New issues of alternative currencies can also be 
disruptive.   We believe that our paper is the first in the literature to look at the impact of 
alternative cryptocurrencies to document this finding.” 
 
 
(d) I see in your tables that the results for these tests are largely statistically significant, but 
once again a more detailed explanation of coefficients would be appreciated. 
Response: Thank you. This version of the paper provides such details for each of the tables to 
enhance the presentation of our empirical findings. 
6. What are the policy implications of your work? For instance, can it be used to assess the 
necessity of the introduction of Bitcoin futures in the first place, or point towards a desired 
change in the way futures markets in the Bitcoin are currently working etc. 
Response:  Thank you for mentioning these issues.  In this version, we have provided some 
discussion of the implications of our findings for both policymakers and investors in the 
conclusion section.  As we note there, 
“Our findings should be of considerable interest for both policymakers and investors. For policy 
makers, our findings suggest the importance of monitoring markets for signals of  fraudulent 
activities. Deviations from efficiency are significantly impacted by such events, and could be 
used as triggers to enhance market surveillance – e.g. investigating futures contract positions 
around such triggers. Furthermore, exchanges should be encouraged to facilitate the introduction 
and development of standardized contracts that guarantee spot delivery, similar to the new 
futures contracts that provide physical delivery of Bitcoin. For investors, our findings clearly 
highlight that not only is speculation in Bitcoin risky, but that that there are also significant risks 
associated with Bitcoin spot/future arbitrage strategies.  
Minor comments: 
1. Typos in the paper must be addressed. 
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2. Sentences used are typically long and tend to get unclear in meaning. It might be 
advisable to stick to short and clear sentences. 
Response: Thank you. We have done considerable editorial work to rectify these issues. 
Thank you again for your careful and thoughtful reading of our work. The paper has greatly 




Response to Referee Report, Reviewer 3 
 
Research in International Business and Finance 
Pricing Efficiency and Arbitrage in the Bitcoin Spot and Futures Markets, 
RIBAF_2019_952 
 
Thank you for your kind remarks. We are pleased that you find the paper to be a very interesting 
investigation. We are highly appreciative of your constructive comments and suggestions for 
improvements, which have helped us to make a substantial revision of the paper. We have 
addressed your remarks in the revised draft. In this document, we provide detailed responses to 
your specific comments (in Italics). Since we received reports from two other referees as well, 
some of the changes are due to that report. We hope for your understanding of the fact that we 
occasionally had to decide between suggestions made by you and the other referees. 
 
- The paper presents a very interesting empirical investigation on the speculative efficiency of 
Bitcoin. The structure of the paper, is fine but it  needs improvement. I miss a (brief) literature 
review and discussion of previous literature. Published papers on cryptocurrencies is growing 
within leading finance and economics journals. Therefore, the authors should, first contextualize 
their work. 
First, the authors should cite past literature in this field, discussing informational efficiency at 
the initial level, to motivate the study: 
1. A. F. Bariviera, The inefficiency of Bitcoin revisited: A dynamic approach. Econ. Lett. 161, 1-
4 (2017). 
2. B. M. Blau, Price dynamics and speculative trading in Bitcoin. Res. Int. Bus. 
Financ. 43, 15-21 (2018). 
3. E. Bouri, S. J. H. Shahzad, D. Roubaud, Co-explosivity in the cryptocurrency market. 
Financ. Res. Lett. (2018), doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2018.07.005. 
4. J. Fry, Booms, busts and heavy-tails: The story of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
markets? Econ. Lett. 171, 225-229 (2018). 
5. P. Katsiampa, Volatility estimation for Bitcoin: A comparison of GARCH models. Econ. 
Lett. 158, 3-6 (2017). 
6. L. Kristoufek, What Are the Main Drivers of the Bitcoin Price? Evidence from Wavelet 
Coherence Analysis. PLoS One. 10, eo123923 (2015). 
7. I. Merediz-Sola, A. F. Bariviera, A bibliometric analysis of Bitcoin scientific 
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production. Res. Int. Bus. Financ. 50, 294-305 (2019). 
8. A. Urquhart, The inefficiency of Bitcoin. Econ. Lett. 148, 80-82 (2016). 
9. T. V. H. Nguyen, B. T. Nguyen, T. C. Nguyen, Q. Q. Nguyen, Bitcoin return: Impacts from 
the introduction of new altcoins. Res. Int. Bus. Financ. 48, 420-425 (2019). 
 
Then, the authors should study and benchmark their results with those already published on the 
relationship between spot and future prices in cryptocurrencies: 
1. G. M. Caporale, L. Gil-alana, A. Plastun, Persistence in the Cryptocurrency Market. 
Ger. Inst. Econ. Res., 1-19 (2017). 
 
Response: We appreciate these comments that allow us to better motivate the paper to better 
articulate and clarify its contributions to the literature.  To this end, we have rewritten the 
introduction, and have provided a new Literature Review section, that covers the burgeoning 
literature that  the referee alludes to. As discussed in our responses to Referees 1 and 2, this provides 
a basis for benchmarking our approaches and  findings  in terms of  extant studies. 
 
Thank you again for your careful and thoughtful reading of our work. The paper has greatly 
benefitted from your comments. 
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This study examines the pricing efficiency for the leading cryptocurrency, Bitcoin using spot prices 
and all CBOE and CME futures contracts traded from January 2018 to March 2019.  We find that the 
futures basis provide some predictive power for future changes in the spot price and in the risk 
premium. However, the basis of Bitcoin is a biased predictor of the future spot price changes. 
Cointegration tests also demonstrate that futures prices are biased predictors of spot prices. Deviations 
from no-arbitrage between spot and futures markets are persistent and widen significantly with 
Bitcoin thefts (hacks, frauds) as well as alternative cryptocurrency issuances. 
JEL Classification: E31; E42; G11; G12; G14 





The novelty of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, as well as Bitcoin’s unprecedented 
performance and volatility since its inception, have drawn the attention of practitioners, regulators, 
and scholars. New spot exchanges and organized futures contracts have emerged to facilitate the 
appetites of investors interested in this new asset class. Extreme market volatility has given rise to 
widespread government regulatory interventions in Bitcoin transactions in several countries, as 
shown in Table 1.  
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
A burgeoning academic literature has also emerged on digitalization and cryptocurrencies that crosses 
several disciplines, including computer science, economics, and finance. Our paper looks at Bitcoin 
from an “efficient markets” perspective. In particular, we provide new evidence concerning   
informational efficiency of Bitcoin from the perspective of speculators. Several papers have appeared 
that look at the informational efficiency of Bitcoin, with mixed results (e.g. Urquhart (2016), 
Bariviera (2017), Baur and Dimpfl (2019), Zhang (2018), Charfeddine and Maouchi (2019), Sensoy 
(2019), Gandar et al (2018), Köchling et al (2019) Kapar and Olmo (2019),  Yonghong et al (2019),  
and Fassas, Papadamou, and Koulis (2020)). A number of these studies look at the informational 
content of futures prices vs. spot prices (e.g. Baur and Dimpfl (2019), Kapar and Olmo (2019), and 
Fassas, Papadamou, and Koulis (2020)). None of these studies look at the potential biases of futures 
prices, per se. Our study provides new evidence on this score, looking at the futures basis as a 
predictor of spot price changes, and at futures prices as predictors of spot prices. We also contribute 
to the literature by examining the nature of efficiency of Bitcoin spot and futures markets in terms of 
allocational efficiency using the no-arbitrage framework. In this approach, we look at deviations from 
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no-arbitrage bounds between spot and futures markets. 
Our results demonstrate that the futures basis contains information about future spot changes 
and the futures risk premium. However, we also show that the futures basis is a biased predictor of 
future spot changes. Furthermore, we find that futures prices are biased predictors of future spot 
prices. We also document systematic and persistent deviations from no-arbitrage prices. In addition, 
we identify potentially profitable risk free futures/spot trades that are not consistent with allocational 
efficiency. In particular, we find persistent underpricing of futures contracts. Finally, we find that 
deviations from no-arbitrage prices widen with Bitcoin thefts (episodes of hackings, frauds), and 
issuances of alternative cryptocurrencies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief 
review of the literature. Section 3 discusses the methodological approaches for the analyses. In 
section 4, we describe the data and present the basic results. In section 5 we look at possible underlying 
factors that may explain persistent inefficiencies, including thefts due to hacking and new 
cryptocurrency issuances. The paper concludes with a summary in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Since Bitcoin’s inception, researchers have examined Bitcoin from at least three perspectives: 
a) technical analysis that focuses on past patterns of prices and returns; b) fundamental analyses that 
looks at macroeconomic and other structural drivers of returns; and c) an efficient markets perspective 
that looks at how market prices reflect information. In regard to: a) several papers have focused on 
the speculative bubble framework (see e.g.  Garcia et al. (2014), Cheah and Fry (2015), Li et al. 
(2018), Hafner (2018)), Cheung et al. (2015) as well as Su et al. (2018).  In contrast, Cagli (2019) 
and Bouri et al (2019) provide evidence that movements of cryptocurrencies follow explosive 
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processes.   
Other papers have taken a more fundamental approach, looking at basic market supply- 
demand factors within a commodity market perspective.  This approach assesses the extent to which 
the price of Bitcoin is equal to its intrinsic value. Assuming that cryptocurrency markets are perfectly 
competitive, the marginal mining cost of Bitcoin can provide a floor for its intrinsic value (e.g. Hayes 
(2016)).  Shazad et al (2019) and Wang et al (2019) argue that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies can 
be viewed as weak “safe haven” commodities, similar in character to Gold. This contrasts with 
Yermack (2015) and Bauer et al (2017).  Chan et al (2019) analyze the hedging ability of Bitcoin 
against major equity indices and suggest that Bitcoin can actually serve as a hedge for S&P500 using 
medium frequency data. Kristoufek (2015) suggests that several fundamental macroeconomic factors 
influence the long-run price of Bitcoin. In contrast, Ciaian et al. (2016) argue that other factors, such 
as investment attractiveness, have a more prominent role in Bitcoin price formation. Other studies 
have highlighted interconnections between alternative cryptocurrencies.  In this vein, Beneki et al 
(2019) find evidence of volatility transmission between Bitcoin and Ethereum markets. They suggest 
possible trading strategies that make use of this transmission across cryptocurrencies. Dastgir et al 
(2019) find a bi-directional causal relationship between Bitcoin attention, measured by Google trends 
and search queries and Bitcoin’s return. These relationships are observed primarily in the tails of the 
returns’ distribution. 
A third approach, which serves as the basis of our analyses is the efficient markets perspective. 
Urquhart (2016) provides evidence of weak form inefficiency (Fama (1970)) in tests based on the 
dependent structure of the time series behavior of the cryptocurrency’s returns. Additionally, 
Yonghong et al (2019), Bariviera (2017) and Zhang (2018) provide evidence of a long-term memory 
process in the Bitcoin market with various time-series windows. Charfeddine and Maouchi (2019) 
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show Long Range Dependence (LRD) behavior in the returns and volatility series of several 
cryptocurrencies. In contrast, Sensoy (2019) suggests that Bitcoin prices experience fewer 
inefficiencies using intraday prices. Gandar et al (2018) identify potential sources of inefficiencies in 
the spot market: suspicious trades that have a significant impact on prices. 
A few studies have appeared that look at the effects of trading of bitcoin futures markets on 
the efficiency of the Bitcoin spot markets. Köchling et al (2019) suggest that the introduction of 
Bitcoin futures has improved the pricing efficiency of Bitcoin spot prices. However, they do not look 
at the interactions between Bitcoin futures and spot prices.  In a paper along these lines, Baur and 
Dimpfl (2019) show evidence that the futures price of Bitcoin is led by its spot price. In contrast, 
Kapar and Olmo (2019) suggest that while both futures and spot markets respond to common news, 
Bitcoin futures prices might provide significant information for Bitcoin spot price discovery. In a 
more recent paper, Fassas, Papadamou, and Koulis (2020) show similar results.  They also find a bi-
directional dependence of intraday volatility for both markets. None of the aforementioned studies 
examine whether the information imparted by futures prices may be biased. 
Our study proposes to reexamine the issue of informational efficiency of Bitcoin futures 
contracts studied in Baur and Dimpfl (2019), Kapar and Olmo (2019) and Fassas, Papadamou, and 
Koulis (2020). We extend these studies with direct tests for potential biases in the futures basis as a 
predictor of spot prices as well as for futures prices as predictors of spot prices.  In addition, we look 
at the markets in terms of arbitrage efficiency: a) Do prices deviate from arbitrage bounds that give 
rise to profitable trading opportunities; b) Can we identify sources that are associated with persistent 




3. Methodological Approach 
3.1 Speculative Efficiency Tests 
3.1.1 Bitcoin Futures Basis and Bitcoin Spot Price Changes 
Similar to Baur and Dimpfl (2019) and Kapar and Olmo (2019) we examine the efficiency of 
the Bitcoin market using both spot prices and futures prices. As mentioned above, Baur and Dimpfl 
(2018) show evidence that the futures price of Bitcoin is led by its spot price, which contrasts with 
Kapar and Olmo (2019). In this paper we extend Baur and Dimpfl (2019) and Kapar and Olmo (2019) 
to the test for market efficiency by identifying distinct arbitrage opportunities for traders across spot 
and derivatives markets. To test this issue, we focus on periods when synchronous speculation and 
arbitrage can actually take place. Can futures prices serve as valid predictors of spot prices for 
speculative trades? To address this question, we first implement the well-known Fama (1984) 
regression approach, imposing the Fama and French (1987) “adding up” constraints to test for 
speculative efficiency.1 The two equations estimated are as follows: 
𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) + 𝜀1,𝑡+1             (1) 
and 
𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡+1 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) + 𝜀2,𝑡+1             (2) 
where 𝑃𝑡 and 𝐹𝑡 are the spot and future prices of Bitcoin at time t, respectively. 𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡+1 
defines the risk premium and (𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) refers the basis at time t. Given the adding-up constraints 
                                                     
1 This approach has been widely used as a benchmark test in speculative efficiency studies for a wide range of futures 
products. See  e.g. Khoury et al (1991), Switzer and El-Khoury (2007), Switzer and Fan (2009), Huisman and Kilic (2012), 
Symeonidis et al (2012), Asche et al (2016),  Stevens (2013), Wu and Zheng (2019) to name a few. 
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(Fama and French (1987)), the estimated intercept terms α1 and α2 sum to zero, and the sum of the 
estimated slope terms 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is equal to 1.  To the extent that 𝛽1 is positive and significant in  equation 
(1), we will be able to infer that the basis, (𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) contains some information about the spot price 
change of Bitcoin in the future. Equivalently stated, the Bitcoin futures price has power to predict 
future spot prices. Positive and significant estimates of 𝛽2 are consistent with a time varying risk 
premium. Unbiasedness of the predictors is tested by performing Wald tests of the joint hypotheses 
for α1=0, β1=1 and α2=0, β2=1.  
 
 3.1.2 Cointegration Tests: Futures Prices as unbiased predictors of Spot Prices 
As a second test of Bitcoin Futures market efficiency, we examine the nature of the 
cointegration of spot and futures prices, and the potential biases of the cointegration vector. This 
approach typically focuses on the Keynes-Hicks and Fama (1970) weak form/speculative market 
efficiency tests of the form: 
  
                   titt FS                             (3) 
In this approach, market efficiency requires that futures prices should be unbiased predictors of future 
spot prices. Simple empirical tests of the speculative efficiency hypothesis are based on tests of the 
joint hypothesis 1,0    in (3).  
Basic cointegration tests for Bitcoin spot and futures are also provided in Kapar and Olmo 
(2019) and Fassas, Papadamou, et al (2020). In this paper we use Johansen’s (1988, 1991) approach 
in order to test for cointegration, as well as for efficiency and bias of Bitcoin futures. 












     t-1X D ΠX Γ X     (4) 
where tX = tX - 1tX ; D is a deterministic term;Π  and Γ are matrices of coefficients. The 
cointegration relationship is examined by looking at the rank of the coefficient of matrixΠ . If rank
Π  = 0, there is no cointegration vector, hence no cointegration relationship.  
If rank Π  = 1, then the two series are cointegrated (Johansen and Juselius (1990)). The trace 
and maximum statistics are used.2 If the Bitcoin spot and futures contract prices are cointegrated, then 
a long-run relationship must exist between these two series. 
 Cointegration is considered as a necessary condition for market efficiency (Lai and Lai  
(1991)). However, in order to conclude efficiency, we also examine whether futures contracts are 
unbiased predictors of future spot markets i.e. α = 0 and β = 1. 
3.2 Futures-Spot Arbitrage Efficiency Tests 
Do Bitcoin futures markets facilitate efficient pricing through arbitrage? We address this 
issue using the cost-of-carry model (e.g. MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), Bhatt and Cakici 
(1990), Switzer et al (2000), Andani et al (2009), and Switzer et al (2013)).  Mispricing is based on 
the deviation of the futures price prevailing in the market at time t for a contract with a maturity of 
T: F(t,T) and the arbitrage free expected Futures price F
e
(t,T): 
                                                     
2 The trace statistic tests the null that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against and unspecified 
hypothesis; whereas the maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null that the number of cointegrating vectors is r against 
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𝑥𝑡 = (𝐹(𝑡,𝑇) − 𝐹(𝑡,𝑇)
𝑒 )/𝑃𝑡                                                 (5) 
The mispricing term x, represents an arbitrage opportunity, which would be indicative of 
inefficiency. Our focus here is on the impact of Bitcoin thefts/hacks and alternative cryptocurrency 
issues, as they may contribute to inefficiency, through reduced liquidity and thin trading. Bitcoin 
thefts and hacks serve to lower the confidence of investors in Bitcoin. Markets with compromised 
integrity are by their very essence inefficient. New cryptocurrencies may serve as alternatives or 
substitutes for Bitcoin, and their issuance should lower the demand for Bitcoin, which would 
contribute to market thinness. There is a fairly large literature that relates illiquid markets to   
informational inefficiency (see e.g. Tomek, (1980), Elfakhani et al (1999), Garbade and Silber (1983), 
and Figuerola-Ferretti, and Gonzalo (2010)). Thin trading in spot and futures markets together 
impedes efficiency in terms of price discovery of both markets, which would impede arbitrage (see 
e.g. Adamer, Bohl, and Gross (2016) and Schroeder, Tonsor, and Coffey (2019)).  Indeed, trading 
thinness is a key factor underlying the demise of the CBOE futures contracts for Bitcoin.   
 
4. Data and Empirical Results 
Both the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the CBOE introduced futures contracts 
on Bitcoin in December 2017. Our analyses of spot-futures pricing efficiency use all contracts on 
these exchanges from January 2018 contracts to March 2019.  The CBOE contracts are obtained from 
the exchange’s website; spot prices and the CME contract prices are obtained from Bloomberg. We 
look at the monthly nearby-contracts for the CBOE and CME held to expiration as well as contracts 
that are rolled over 7 days before expiration. We use the 1-month US T-bill rate from the Federal 
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Reserve Board as the risk-free rates used in the arbitrage analyses.3  
4.1 Speculative Efficiency Tests: Results of Fama (1984) Model with the Fama and French 
(1987) adding up constraints 
A prerequisite condition for estimation of equations (1) and (2) is the stationarity of the data 
series. We conduct two standard unit root tests: augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, and Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests. The results are shown in Table 2. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
The results reported in the table show that the basis, the risk premium, and the change in the 
spot prices data series are stationary, rejecting existence of unit root process. Note that the tests results 
are quite similar, regardless of the contract exchange (CBOE vs. CME), and rollover period (at 
expiration vs. rolled over to the next contract seven days prior to expiration. The test statistics for the 
basis are also similar to the risk premia statistics (e.g. ADF in excess of 5 in absolute value for the 
CBOE contracts and in the neighborhood of 4 in absolute value for the CME contracts). Therefore, 
we can infer that the regression models are not subject to spurious inference biases. 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the Fama (1984) equations (1) and (2) 
imposing the adding-up constraints (Fama and French (1987)), the estimated intercept terms α1 and 
α2 sum to zero, and the sum of the estimated slope terms 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is equal to 1. Since 𝛽1 is positive and 
significant for both CBOT and CME contracts in equation (1), with estimates in excess of .06 and  p 
values less than 1% in all cases, we can infer that the basis, (𝐹𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) contains some information about 
the spot price change of Bitcoin in the future. Equivalently stated, the Bitcoin futures price has power 
                                                     
3 Similar results are also obtained using the 3-month T-bill rate. 
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to predict future spot prices. The results of the estimation of equation (2) are consistent with those of 
equation (1). The positive and significant (with p values less than 1%) estimates of 𝛽2 are consistent 
with a time varying risk premium. With the basis at time t serving as a predictor of the risk premium. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
The Wald tests do not support unbiasedness of the predictors, since the joint tests for α1=0, 
β1=1 and α2=0, β2=1 are significant, with p values all less than 1% for all the contracts examined, as 
shown in Table 4.  As indicated therein, changes in the basis (or futures prices) are not reflected as 
commensurate changes in spot prices or in the futures risk premium. More specifically, the current 
basis overestimates the change in spot prices, and underestimates the risk premium. 
                                          [Please insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.2 Cointegration Test Results 
Before conducting the cointegration tests, we first test for the order of integration in each of 
the spot and the futures series using various unit root tests. Table 5 shows the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests for the log Bitcoin spot prices and the corresponding 
CBOE and CME log futures prices.  In all cases we cannot reject the hypothesis of unit roots for log 
price and log futures price levels at better than 1% significance levels, with ADF test statistics ranging 
from -1.4 to -2.4.  Furthermore, the first differences of the spot contract, and all futures contracts, are 
stationary, with highly significant ADF test statistics ranging from about -17 to -18. Similar 
conclusions are obtained using the PP test statistics. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
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Based on the results derived from equations (3) and (4), the futures basis contains information, 
albeit biased, about future spot price changes. This implies that there exists a linear relationship 
between the spot and the futures series that is expected to be stationary. In other words, a cointegrating 
relationship is expected to exist between the two series as represented in (3).  As shown in Table 6, 
the test statistics reject the assumption of no-cointegration. The trace statistics exceed the 5% critical 
value of 12.32 for all contracts, irrespective of the futures holding period.   
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 7 shows the Normalized coefficients of the cointegration vector.  For all of the contracts, 
the estimated log futures coefficient is approximately -1.04, and is significant at the 1% level. This 
confirms that each of the price series contains some information that is useful in predicting its 
counterpart. Is this information unbiased? 
[Please Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 8 specifically tests the issue of whether the futures contracts are efficient and unbiased 
predictors of future spot prices i.e. testing market efficiency by examining the joint hypothesis of α 
= 0 and β = 1. Based on the estimated Likelihood Ratio statistics, which range from 5 to over 7, we 
reject the null that the cointegrating vector is given by (1,-1). Bitcoin futures contract prices are 
therefore biased predictors of future spot prices. 
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.3 Futures-Spot Arbitrage Test Results 
As discussed above, mispricing is based on the deviation of the futures price prevailing in the 
market at time t for a contract with a maturity of T: F(t,T) and the arbitrage free expected Futures price 
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Fe(t,T): 
𝑥𝑡 = (𝐹(𝑡,𝑇) − 𝐹(𝑡,𝑇)
𝑒 )/𝑃𝑡 
where 𝐹(𝑡,𝑇) is Bitcoin future price at time t with the maturity date of T, and 𝐹(𝑡,𝑇)
𝑒  = 𝑃𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑓∗(𝑡−𝑇), 
where rf is risk free rate. Descriptive statistics of the mispricing term and absolute value of the 
mispricing term are presented in Table 9. On average, the mispricing terms are negative, which is 
indicative of futures underpricing. The positive skew statistics are indicative of a distribution biased 
to underpricing. This is consistent with a discount to futures during bearish market conditions, which 
is largely characteristic of the Bitcoin markets since the introduction of futures contracts.  
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
5. Sources of Impediments of Futures-Spot Arbitrage: Thefts/Hacks and Alternative 
Cryptocurrency Issuances 
Several factors might serve as sources of deviations from futures-spot arbitrage. Such factors 
would include trading frictions due to the extreme volatility of the markets that could inhibit or restrict 
trading in futures. For example, both the CBOE and CME impose price limits/circuit breakers for 
Bitcoin futures contracts.4 In addition, failures of significant spot exchanges would adversely affect 
both long and short trading of spot Bitcoins. Regarding the latter, given the lack of physical delivery 
of the physical product at expiration combined with an illiquid spot market may inhibit short selling.5 
                                                     
4 During the period analyzed in this paper the CBOE imposed two-minute trading halts for its Bitcoin contracts if the 
best bid in the XBT futures contract that is closest to expiration exceeds or falls below the daily settlement price of this 
contract of the previous business day by 10 percent or more. At the resumption of trading, if the best bid of the contract 
exceeds or falls below the settlement price of the previous day’s contract by at least 20 percent,  a 5 minutes trading halt 
is imposed. CME applies price limits (circuit breakers) of 7%, 13%, and 20% to the futures fixing price. See 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-bitcoin-futures-contracts/bitcoin-futures-contracts-at-cme-and-cboe-
idUSKBN1E92K9 and https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/equity-index/us- index/bitcoin_contract_specifications.html 
5 A number of exchanges do provide contracts for short selling. See: https://99bitcoins.com/short-sell-bitcoin/ 
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Our focus here is on the impact of thefts (incidents of hacking) and alternative cryptocurrency issues.  
With regard to the former, although Bitcoin has been touted for the integrity of its security system, 
several incidences of thefts (through hacking) highlight its actual vulnerabilities: A recent example 
is the case of Quadriga.6 The chronology of major events involving Bitcoin exchanges security events 
(hacks and frauds) is shown in Figure 1 and Table 10 below. 
[Please insert Figure 1 and Table 10 about here] 
Bitcoin thefts (hacks and frauds) undermine the reliability of transactions in the spot market.  
Buying spot bitcoin is more difficult in a market where liquidity is compromised. This reduces the 
incentive of spot arbitrageurs to take positions in the market.  
As can be seen in figures 2 and 3, mispricing and absolute mispricing the exhibit a significant 
spike in the first week of November 2018. This month was particularly bearish, with bitcoin 
exhibiting a monthly decline of about 37%. Was the jump in Bitcoin mispricing attributable to 
security concerns related to hacking and other forms of fraud? Notable examples were the thefts of 
Bithumb and Zaif, where several thousand BTCs disappeared.  These events resulted in losses of $31 
million and $60 million U.S. dollars to owners respectively. 
 
[Please insert Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
 
While Bitcoin is the leading cryptocurrency market, it does not have a monopoly on the 
market: a number of competing virtual currencies have been issued in recent years. Table 11 provides 
                                                     
6 Doug Alexander, Quadriga Crypto Mystery Deepens With ‘Cold Wallets’ Found Empty, Bloomberg, March 1, 2019, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-01/quadriga-has-6-cold-wallets-but-they-don-t-hold-any- 
crypto, accessed on April 13, 2019 
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a list of major alternative cryptocurrencies issuances (initial coin offerings or ICOs) and their release 
dates. 
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
As these new cryptocurrencies may serve as alternatives or substitutes for Bitcoin, their 
issuance should lower the demand for  Bitcoin, which, aside from contributing to the bearish bias of 
the markets (from the skewness in returns)  would contribute to market thinness.   Market  thinness 
is generally associated with informational inefficiency, as discussed above.  
Figure 4 superimposes these alternative coin releases on the path of Bitcoin prices since April 
2010. 
[Please insert Figure 4 about here] 
Note that the alternative coins have been released at discrete points in time. Discerning their 
impact on Bitcoin prices on the release dates is not clear-cut, however. For example, Litecoin, Stellar, 
Ripple, Tether, and Ethereum were launched before 2017, and no observable impact on Bitcoin prices 
is evident on release days. EOS, Bitcoin Cash, and TRON were launched during a bullish period of 
the Bitcoin market, while Bitcoin SV was introduced in the more bearish period. None of these 
releases has an apparent immediate effect on the market. One explanation is that Bitcoin is still the 
dominant player among the cryptocurrencies. In fact, the market capitalization of Bitcoin is five times 
larger than Ripple, which is the second biggest cryptocurrency market as of January 30, 2019. This 
distinguishable market capitalization of Bitcoin imply that the alternatives may not have sufficient 
market shares to influence Bitcoin’s price. 
A casual glance at Figures in the period up to 2017 suggests that the impacts of Bitcoin 
security concerns and new coin releases on the price of Bitcoin were muted. One could argue that up 
until 2017, the legitimacy of the market was still in question. This changed with the launching of 
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futures contracts on Bitcoin in December 2017, on both the CBOE and the CME. An alternative 
perspective is that the effects of new issues of alternative currencies should be cumulative, as they 
receive acceptance in the markets; their effects might not be confined to the issuance day alone but 
for a few days subsequent to their issuance. 
To formally capture the impacts of these events on Bitcoin’s price, we regress the mispricing 
term,  𝑥𝑡 on dummy variables that represent events of identified Bitcoin hacks/frauds issue as well as 
alternative coin releases.  In a recent study, Gandar, Hamrick, Moor and Oberman (2018) similarly 
use dummy variables to look at the impact of suspicious trades and potential price manipulation in 
the Bitcoin market.  The model as follows: 
                      𝑥𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝐶𝑢𝑚t + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛t + 𝜀 𝑡                              (5) 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝐶𝑢𝑚t  is cumulative amount of stolen Bitcoin by the time t,  𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛t  is dummy 
variable indicating new cryptocurrency release dates, and 𝜀 𝑡 is the error term. For 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛t, only 
top 50 cryptocurrencies in market capitalization are considered, as of April 11, 2019.7 The results of 
the estimation of (5) using OLS are shown in Table 12. 
[Please insert Table 12 about here] 
Looking at the constant term in Table 12, our regression results show that Bitcoin Futures 
contracts are underpriced by between 7-8% for the CBOT Contracts; the “no-arbitrage” underpricing 
is even  higher  for the CME contracts (12.9-14%),  Furthermore, we note that thefts/hacks of Bitcoin 
as well as new cryptocurrency releases amplify the inefficiency. Alternative coin release variable also 
shows significant coefficients except for CBOE’s futures contract with nearby rollover data series. 
                                                     
7 Data Source: https://coinmarketcap.com/ 
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Overall, both Bitcoin security concerns and new cryptocurrency releases may lead considerable gap 
between the futures price and spot price in the future. As shown in Table 12, thefts/hacks and 
alternative cryptocurrencies are associated with larger mispricing.  New coin issues have a large direct 
effect, increasing the (underpricing) arbitrage deviation of Bitcoin futures by 3-5% for CBOE 
contracts, and by 6-8% for CME contracts. Thefts/hacks are also highly significant both economically 
and statistically. At the margin, based on the estimates of Table 12,  thefts in an increment of  1000 
Bitcoins will increase the arbitrage futures discount by about 2%.  In sum, our results on thefts/hacks 
and new cryptocurrency release are consistent with our expectations since a) thefts/hacks directly 
undermine the spot market. Short selling spot bitcoin when futures are underpriced is more difficult 
in a market where liquidity is compromised. This reduces the incentive of spot arbitrageurs to take 
positions in the market; b) Buying spot may be less attractive to the extent that alternative or substitute 
cryptocurrencies are available. 
To test for the robustness of the results, we also estimated the model using EGARCH, to 
capture the effects  of skewness and leptokurtosis in the mispricing terms (from Table 9), as well as 
of time varying asymmetric volatility. The results are shown in Table 13 below, where the coefficients 
and their respective p value significance levels are reported. As can be seen, our inferences 
concerning Bitcoin hacks and alternative cryptocurrency releases are unchanged. The degree of 
arbitrage underpricing is about 4% smaller in all the estimations using EGARCH, although 
underpricing remains economically and statistically significant for both the CBOE and CME 
contracts. Furthermore, all of the EGARCH coefficients C(7) are less than one, indicating that while 
cumulative hack and new currency release effects may be significant, persistence of GARCH effects 
is not. 
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[Please insert Table 13 about here] 
6. Conclusion 
This study looks at the efficiency of the Bitcoin spot and futures markets using synchronous 
end of day trading data. We find that the futures basis does provide some information on future 
changes in the spot price, and the risk premium, although the predictors are not unbiased. Changes in 
the basis are not reflected as commensurate changes in spot prices or in the futures risk premium.  In 
addition, while Bitcoin spot and futures are cointegrated, Bitcoin futures are biased predictors of spot 
prices, which is not consistent with (weak-form) speculative efficiency. 
We also find deviations from futures-spot arbitrage that are not consistent with market 
efficiency. Several factors might explain this result. Such factors would include trading frictions that 
would be exacerbated by extreme volatility of the markets. The results herein document that 
deviations from arbitrage bounds widen significantly as a consequence of thefts/hacks that leave 
clients and traders bereft. Deviations from arbitrage bounds also increase with alternative 
cryptocurrency issuances.  
Our findings should be of considerable interest for both policymakers and investors. For 
policy makers, our findings suggest the importance of monitoring markets for signals of  fraudulent 
activities. Deviations from efficiency are significantly impacted by such events, and could be used as 
triggers to enhance market surveillance – e.g. investigating futures contract positions around such 
triggers. Furthermore, exchanges should be encouraged to facilitate the introduction and development 
of standardized contracts that guarantee spot delivery, similar to the new futures contracts that provide 
physical delivery of Bitcoin. For investors, our findings clearly highlight that not only is speculation 
in Bitcoin risky, but that that there are also significant risks associated with Bitcoin spot/future 
arbitrage strategies.   
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Figure 1. BitCoin Prices and Major Exchange Hacks (March 2010 – January 2019) 
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Table 1. Chronology of Government Regulations on Bitcoin Transactions 
 
Date Country Description 
June 4, 2018 The United States The Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Valerie A. 
Szczepanik has been named Associate Director of the Division of 
Corporation Finance and Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and 
Innovation for Division Director Bill Hinman, the newly created 
branch to manage cryptocurrency. 
January 22, 2018 South Korea South Korea brought in a regulation that requires all Bitcoin traders 
to reveal their identity, thus putting a ban on anonymous trading of 
bitcoins 
January 19, 2018 The United States The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed charges 
against two cryptocurrency fraud cases. 
December 27, 2017 South Korea Korea’s government announced that it will impose additional 
measures to regulate speculation in cryptocurrency trading within the 
country. 
December 6, 2017 South Korea Korea's Financial Services Commission issued a ban on the trading of 
Bitcoin futures, prompting several securities firms to cancel seminars 
scheduled in December for bitcoin future investors 
November 11, 2017 The United States Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin mentioned he had established 
working-groups at treasury looking at bitcoin and that it is something 
they will be watching "very carefully." 
September 29, 2017 The United States The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) filed a civil 
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York against the sponsors of two “initial coin offerings” (ICOs) for 
alleged violations of U.S. securities laws 
September 4, 2017 China China banned all companies and individuals from raising funds 
through ICO activities, reiterating that ICOs are considered illegal 
activity in the country 
July 25, 2017 The United States The SEC issued an investor bulletin about initial coin offerings, saying 
they can be “fair and lawful investment opportunities” but can be used 
improperly. The SEC has issued three enforcement actions against 
ICO sponsors- one halt and exposure of two alleged frauds. 
SEC Chairman Clayton has also expressed concern about market 
participants who extend to customers credit in U.S. 
July 1, 2017 The United States The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
voted to approve a model act providing for the regulation of digital 
currency business at state level 
[Source 1: www.marketwatch.com / Here’s how the U.S. and the world regulate bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies by Francine 
McKenna, accessed on February 9, 2018] 
[Source 2: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-102 / [Press Release] SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior 
Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation, accessed on Jan 31, 2019] 
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Table 2. Unit Root Test Statistics for Fama (1984) Model with Fama-French (1987) constraints 
 
Panel A: CBOE BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover  Nearby   7 Days  
Unit Root Test ADF  PP ADF  PP 
Change in spot -9.8827***  -16.6816*** -9.5041***  -16.6831*** 
Basis -5.7320***  -5.9340*** -5.6850***  -5.8364*** 
Risk premium -5.2160***  -5.9993*** -5.7349***  -5.9359*** 
       
Panel B: CME BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover  Nearby   7 Days  
Unit Root Test ADF  PP ADF  PP 
Change in spot -9.2851***  -16.3040*** -9.3170***  -16.3587*** 
Basis -3.9440***  -4.0684*** -3.9631***  -4.0850*** 
Risk premium -4.2704***  -4.4147*** -4.2883***  -4.4295*** 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3. Results of Fama (1984) Model with Fama-French (1987) constraints 
 
Panel A: CBOE BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover Nearby 7 Days 
Equation (1): Pt+1-Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1  
 α1 β1 F-Stat α1 β1 F-Stat 
Coefficient 97.3997** 0.0606*** 13.7553*** 102.3019** 0.0625*** 15.4107*** 
Standard Error 42.8474 0.0163 - 42.3927 0.0159 - 
Probability 0.0237 0.0002 0.0002 0.0164 0.0001 0.0001 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt+1 =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1  
 α2 β2 F-Stat α2 β2 F-Stat 
Coefficient -97.3997** 0.9394*** 3308.2470*** -102.3019** 0.9375*** 3462.0300*** 
Standard Error 42.8474 0.0163 - 42.3927 0.0159 - 
Probability 0.0237 0.0000 0.0000 0.0164 0.0000 0.0000 
  
Panel B: CME BTC Futures Contracts  
Rollover Nearby 7 Days 
Equation (1): Pt-1- Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1 
 α1 β1 F-Stat α1 β1 F-Stat 
Coefficient 132.2801*** 0.0663*** 15.8842*** 133.3589*** 0.0665*** 16.1867*** 
Standard Error 48.3904 0.0166 - 48.1787 0.0165 - 
Probability 0.0066 0.0001 0.0001 0.0060 0.0001 0.0001 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt+1 =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1 
 α2 β2 F-Stat α2 β2 F-Stat 
Coefficient -132.2801*** 0.9337*** 3151.8007*** -133.3589*** 0.9335*** 3187.6110*** 
Standard Error 48.3904 0.0166 - 48.1787 0.0165 - 
Probability 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Wald Test Results of Fama (1984) Model with Fama and French (1987) Constraints 
 
Panel A: CBOE BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover  Nearby   7 Days  
Equation (1): Pt+1-Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1 
 α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 
F-statistic 3484.2530*** 5.1673** 3308.2470*** 3616.0850*** 5.8235** 3462.0300*** 
df (2, 313) (1, 313) (1, 313) (2, 314) (1, 314) (1, 314) 
Probability 0.0000 0.0237 0.0000 0.0000 0.0164 0.0000 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1 
 α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 
F-statistic 6.9956*** 5.1673** 13.7553*** 7.8213*** 5.8235** 15.4107*** 
df (2, 313) (1, 313) (1, 313) (2, 314) (1, 314) (1, 314) 
Probability 0.0011 0.0237 0.0002 0.0005 0.0164 0.0001 
       
Panel B: CME BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover  Nearby   7 Days  
Equation (1): Pt+1-Pt=α1+β1*(Ft-Pt)+ε1,t+1 
 α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 α1=0, β1=1 α1=0 β1=1 
F-statistic 4000.8910*** 7.4726*** 3151.8007*** 4069.5259*** 7.6619*** 3187.6109*** 
df (2, 300) (1, 300) (1, 300) (2, 302) (1, 302) (1, 302) 
Probability 0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 
Equation (2): Ft- Pt =α2+β2*(Ft - Pt)+ε2,t+1 
 α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 α2=0, β2=1 α2=0 β2=1 
F-statistic 8.0422*** 7.4726*** 15.8842*** 8.1939*** 7.6619*** 16.1867*** 
df (2, 300) (1, 300) (1, 300) (2, 302) (1, 302) (1, 302) 
Probability 0.0004 0.0066 0.0001 0.0003 0.0060 0.0001 








Table 5. Unit Root Test Statistics for Bitcoin Spot and Futures Series 
Panel A: CBOE BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover Nearby 7 Days 
Unit Root Test ADF PP  ADF  PP 
 Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff   Level 1st Diff   Level 1st Diff 
Log(Spot) -1.429 -17.624*** -1.463 -17.627***   -1.423 -17.635***   -1.459 -17.639*** 
Prob. 0.5689 0.0000 0.551 0.000   0.571 0.000   0.553 0.000 
             
Log(Futures) -2.399 -18.060*** -2.386 -18.063***   -2.393 -18.172***   -2.382 -18.169*** 
Prob. 0.143 0.0000 0.146 0.000   0.144 0.000   0.148 0.000 
 
Panel B: CME BTC Futures Contracts 
Rollover Nearby 7 Days 
Unit Root Test ADF PP  ADF DF-GLS PP 
 Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff   Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff 
Log(Spot) -1.449 -17.236*** -1.487 -17.241***   -1.884 -17.294*** -0.898 -17.128*** -1.489 -17.299*** 
Prob. 0.558 0.000 0.539 0.000   0.339 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.538 0.0000 
             
Log(Futures) -1.868 -18.081*** -1.882 -18.084***   -1.884 -18.211*** 0.514 -16.627*** -1.895 -18.204*** 
Prob. 0.347 0.000 0.341 0.000   0.339 0.000 0.607 0.000 0.335 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Johansen Cointegration Tests  
Panel A - CBOE BTC Futures Contracts - Nearby 
Johansen cointegration tests (trace statistics) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.035777  14.46208  12.32090  0.0216 
At most 1  0.009724  3.058645  4.129906  0.0951 
Johansen cointegration tests (max statistics) 
None *  0.035777  11.40343  11.22480  0.0465 
At most 1  0.009724  3.058645  4.129906  0.0951 
Panel B - CBOE BTC Futures Contracts – 7 Days 
Johansen cointegration tests (trace statistics) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.035639  14.02397  12.32090  0.0257 
At most 1  0.008338  2.629049  4.129906  0.1240 
Johansen cointegration tests (max statistics) 
None *  0.035639  11.39493  11.22480  0.0467 
At most 1  0.008338  2.629049  4.129906  0.1240 
Panel C - CME BTC Futures Contracts - Nearby 
Johansen cointegration tests (trace statistics) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None  0.030496  11.97057  12.32090  0.0572 
At most 1  0.008891  2.679314  4.129906  0.1202 
Johansen cointegration tests (max statistics) 
None  0.030496  9.291256  11.22480  0.1073 
At most 1  0.008891  2.679314  4.129906  0.1202 
Panel D - CME BTC Futures Contracts – 7 Days 
Johansen cointegration tests (trace statistics) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None  0.029995  11.84491  12.32090  0.0600 
At most 1  0.008729  2.647663  4.129906  0.1225 
Johansen cointegration tests (t max statistics) 
None  0.029995  9.197250  11.22480  0.1113 








Table 7. Cointegrating Vector: Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses, t-
statistic in square brackets). 
Panel A - CBOE BTC Futures Contracts - Nearby 
Log Spot Log futures 
1.000000 -1.042556 *** 
 (0.00933)  
 [-111.737] 
Panel B - CBOE BTC Futures Contracts – 7 Days 
Log Spot Log futures 
1.000000 -1.043027 ***   
 (0.00939)  
 [-111.093] 
Panel C - CME BTC Futures Contracts - Nearby 
Log Spot Log futures 
1.000000 -1.042110  *** 
 (0.00962)  
 [-108.346] 
Panel D - CME BTC Futures Contracts – 7 Days 
Log Spot Log futures 
1.000000 -1.042463***  
 (0.00974)  
 [-107.076] 









Table 8. Test of Cointegrating Restrictions 
Panel A - CBOE BTC Futures Contracts - Nearby 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Restricted log-likelihood  LR Statistic Degrees of Freedom Probability 
1  1012.885  7.309007 1  0.006861 
Panel B - CBOE BTC Futures Contracts – 7 Days 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Restricted log-likelihood  LR Statistic Degrees of Freedom Probability 
1  1014.078  7.708341 1  0.005497 
Panel C - CME BTC Futures Contracts - Nearby 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Restricted log-likelihood  LR Statistic Degrees of Freedom Probability 
1  972.8091  5.548736 1  0.018494 
Panel D - CME BTC Futures Contracts – 7 Days 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Restricted log-likelihood  LR Statistic Degrees of Freedom Probability 















Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of Mispricing Term and Absolute Value of Mispricing Term 
 
Exchange  CBOE   CME  
Rollover Nearby 7 Days Nearby 7 Days 
Error Term x abs (x) x abs (x) x abs (x) x abs (x) 
Mean -0.2939 0.3082 -0.3440 0.3567 -0.3193 0.3297 -0.3701 0.3794 
Median -0.2741 0.2779 -0.3169 0.3238 -0.3072 0.3101 -0.3413 0.3444 
Maximum 0.6466 0.7049 0.6466 0.7630 0.3705 0.7121 0.3705 0.7629 
Minimum -0.7049 0.0021 -0.7630 0.0119 -0.7121 0.0050 -0.7629 0.0050 
Std. Dev. 0.2060 0.1838 0.2185 0.1971 0.1909 0.1724 0.1987 0.1802 
Skewness 0.3613 0.3385 0.3667 0.2875 0.2200 0.3021 0.2797 0.2661 
Kurtosis 4.1289 2.0015 4.0265 1.8848 3.2911 2.1240 3.4094 2.0116 
Jarque-Bera 23.7310 19.2207 21.0208 20.7939 3.5141 14.2957 6.1069 16.0157 
Probability 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.1726 0.0008 0.0472 0.0003 
Observations 317 317 317 317 303 303 305 305 
 
Table 10. Chronology of Major Bitcoin Exchange Hacks 
 
Year Month Exchange Amount Stolen (BTC) 
2012 March Bitcoinica 46,703 
2012 May Bitcoinica 18,000 
2012 August Bitcoin Ponzi 265,678 
2012 September Bitfloor 24,000 
2014 February Mt. Gox 850,000 
2014 July Cryptsy 13,000 
2015 January Bitstamp 19,000 
2015 February BTER 7,170 
2016 August Bitfinex 120,000 
2017 December NiceHash 4,736 
2018 April CoinSecure 438 
2018 June Bithumb 2,016 
2018 September Zaif 5,966 
2018 October MapleChange 919 
2019 February Quadriga 154 
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(As of January 30, 2019) 
 
Initial Release 
1 Bitcoin $60,329,884,225 January 9, 2009 
2 Ripple (XRP) $12,444,402,901 August 11, 2013 
3 Ethereum $11,041,665,977 July 30, 2015 
4 EOS $2,098,395,149 June 26, 2017 
5 Tether $2,034,826,407 October 6, 2014 
6 Bitcoin Cash $1,983,990,236 August 1, 2017 
7 Litecoin $1,889,854,900 October 7, 2011 
8 TRON $1,653,533,859 September 12, 2017 
9 Stellar $1,551,518,489 July 31, 2014 
10 Bitcoin SV $1,119,643,115 November 25, 2018 
[Source 1: CoinMarketCap / https://coinmarketcap.com, accessed on Jan 31, 2019] 
[Source 2: coinbase / https://www.coinbase.cm/price, accessed on Jan 31, 2019] 
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Table 12. OLS Estimates of Daily Futures Mispricing Regression with Hack/Stolen Bitcoin and 
New Cryptocurrency Issue Effects 
 
Estimation equation:  
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑢𝑚 +  𝑐3NewCoin + 𝜖𝑡  
 
HackCum constitutes cumulative amount of stolen Bitcoin from December 2017 (in thousands of Bitcoins). 
NewCoin variable is a dummy variable capturing new cryptocurrency release events, which has value of 1 from D-
1 to D+5 of new coin releases, and  0 otherwise. The datasets have two different types of rollover methodologies: 
nearby and 7 days before expiration, and each methodology is presented in Nearby and 7 Days rows, respectively. 
Exchange Rollover Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat Prob   
CBOE Nearby Constant -0.0706 *** 0.0259 -2.7314 0.0067   
  Cumulative Hack       -0.0240 *** 0.0000 -9.6612 0.0000   
  New Coin -0.0325  0.0252 -1.2868 0.1991 R-square 0.2292 
 7 Days Constant -0.0869 *** 0.0268 -3.2424 0.0013   
  Cumulative Hack -0.0272 *** 0.0000 -10.5906 0.0000   
  New Coin -0.0538 ** 0.0265 -2.0330 0.0429 R-square 0.2636 
CME Nearby Constant -0.1288 *** 0.0257 -5.0207 0.0000   
  Cumulative Hack -0.0193 *** 0.0000 -7.8814 0.0000   
  New Coin -0.0709 *** 0.0243 -2.9113 0.0039 R-square 0.1781 
 7 Days Constant -0.1402 *** 0.0265 -5.2922 0.0000   
  Cumulative Hack -0.0235 *** 0.0000 -9.3695 0.0000   
  New Coin -0.0645 *** 0.0246 -2.6260 0.0091 R-square 0.2276 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13. EGARCH Results of Daily Futures Mispricing Regression with Hack/Stolen Bitcoin 
Effects and New Currency Issue Effects 
Estimation equation:  
 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑢𝑚 +  𝑐3NewCoin + 𝜖𝑡  
log(𝜎𝑡









2 )  
 
HackCum  constitutes cumulative amount of stolen Bitcoin from December 2017 (in thousands of Bitcoins).. 
NewCoin variable refers dummy variable of new cryptocurrency release. The dummy variable has value of 1 from 
D-1 to D+5 of new coin releases, otherwise 0. The datasets have two different types of rollover methodologies: 
nearby and 7 days before expiration, and each methodology is presented in Nearby and 7 Days columns, 
respectively. Coefficients and P-values indicators) 
 
Exchange CBOE  CME 
Rollover Nearby 7 Days Nearby 7 Days 
C(1)         -0.0337*** -0.0188* -0.1175*** -0.0854*** 
C(2) -0.0352*** -0.0379*** -0.0277*** -0.0338*** 
C(3)          -0.0180*** -0.0786*** -0.0825*** -0.0511*** 
C(4) -2.0316*** -1.9698*** -2.2689*** -2;2581*** 
C(5) 1.3016***  1.1201*** 1.3440***   1.2992*** 
C(6) 0.1619 0.1337 0.2019 0.1753 











*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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